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For millions of men, the Sacred Road was the first, and often the last, stage in their dreadful agony.

Motorised transport came into its own during the 1914-1918 war. It was practically non-existent in 1914 (on the eve of mobilisation, the Army had only 170 motor vehicles but all the vehicles required were requisitioned) but by 1918, motor transport had become one of the essential features of the war.

The first attempt at rational organisation of motorised means of transport was the evacuation of Reims on 1st and 2nd September 1914, overseen by Captain Doumenc, a member of the General Staff. He was later posted to Verdun where his experience in the organisation of the Bar-Verdun road was to make a marked contribution to changes in ideas on the formation and use of motorised military transport. In particular, the experiments carried out in 1914 and 1915 revealed how essential it was for the success of an operation to have the necessary vehicles on time and to be sure of complete control of the road. Gradually, thanks to one-off analyses and the increase in the number of vehicles resulting from an industrial war effort and the placement of orders with foreign manufacturers (Italy, USA), a general doctrine was established. For example, it became paramount to assemble extensive resources in a reserve, ready to be deployed on the Commander-in-Chief's orders. The reserve consisted of 4 sections of 25 vehicles each (plus a repair workshop). The sections were then formed into 5 or 6 groups. An assembly of some 600 vehicles was capable of transporting an entire brigade in one trip. The first group was set up in April 1916; there were 5 by the end of 1915, 13 in 1916 - and 25 by July 1918.

By the beginning of 1916, thanks to the increase in the number of vehicles, the organisation of the "reserve" and workshops and the progress achieved in the utilisation of these vehicles, they had become an outstanding military tool.

The Battle of Verdun suddenly revealed this fact for, to a large extent, any chance that Verdun might have of putting up resistance depended on the possibility of carrying to the Front reinforcements, munitions and equipment while evacuating troops sent to the rear for R&R and removing the wounded from the battle zone. There was no available rail transport. The Lérouville line was cut at Saint-Mihiel and the line to Châlons was cut at Aubréville. As to the local, narrow-gauge, metric railway linking Bar-le-Duc to Verdun, it could not carry more than 800 tonnes a day at a time when there was a need for at least ten times that capacity. The road was the only means left and the experiences of the previous years were to be applied to this main road (which was widened to 7 metres in 1915). However, the road was full of bends and the cobblestones were badly laid.

On 19th February, faced with an increasingly precise threat along the Front at Verdun, the General Staff decided, at a meeting in Bar le Duc, to hand the problem over to Captain Doumenc, representing the automobile service. On 20th February, the Commission Régulière Automobile was set up, an unusual body which succeeded in organising the logistics required to transport 2,000 tonnes of equipment and munitions per day in the Verdun area while, at the same time, transporting 15,000 to 20,000 men.

It was therefore decided to ensure control of the road. Only motorised vehicles had access to it. Any broken down vehicle that could not be towed was pushed into the ditch. The road itself was divided into 6 areas or "cantons" (each "Chief of Canton" was an agent of the Regulating Committee and had the necessary resources for liaison, surveillance of access roads, and emergency repairs). The automobile service was concerned neither with artillery nor with horse-drawn convoys that moved independently without using the road which was guarded. Nor was it used to transport food, which travelled on the railway through Meuse. However, it was to provide the resources for all the rest - infantry, munitions and miscellaneous equipment. Everything arrived by rail in the Revigny area, Bar-le-Duc and, most of all, at the station in Baudonvillers to the south of Bar, the point of departure for the road which extended over 75 kilometres to the crossroads at Moulin Brûlé. The Regulating Committee was ready to operate by 22nd February. Its head, Commandant Girard (an engineer with the roads & bridges department (Ponts et Chaussées)) had quarries opened up along the road so that, every day, 1,200 territorials could shovel stones directly beneath the solid wheels of vehicles which then, advancing at speeds of between 15 and 20 kph, acted as road rollers. Commandant Girard was assisted, in addition to Captain Doumenc, by 19 officers, 250 subalterns and soldiers. During the Battle of Verdun, the 51 groups (totalling almost 9,000 vehicles of which 6,000 drove ceaselessly up and down this "conveyor belt") carried 90,000 men and 50,000 tonnes of equipment every week, covering a total of 1 million kilometres. In all, 7 motorised groups provided this logistical backup.

Added to the Army's organisational resources, ambulances etc, a total of 8,000 vehicles moved along the road (1 vehicle every 14 seconds) between Bar-le-Duc and Verdun. During the period from March to June 1916, monthly figures showed the displacement of 500,000 tonnes of equipment and 400,000 men, not counting the 200,000 wounded evacuated by the medical services. Throughout the 1914-1918 war, this figure was never exceeded on any single road over such a long period.

Two million tonnes of equipment were transported during the Battle of Verdun while the Territorials tirelessly shovelled 700,000 tonnes of limestone beneath the lorries' wheels every day as the endless string of vehicles passed, working on a round-the-clock rota. Initially, the drivers were required to be at the wheel 18 hours a day. Often they remained on duty for more than 10 days at a time, with no rest other than a few hours' sleep snatched in the back of the lorry. A sense of pride and a very special emulation grew up among these men and they distinguished their groups by insignia e.g. a swan, a trefoil, a cockerel etc. Sections had their own colours. On 15th January 1917, the Regulating Committee was wound up; it had completed its task.

It is clear that this was by far and away the most essential lifeline bringing supplies to the Battle of Verdun.

The metric railway network (known as the "Meusien" or the "Varinot" after its builder) underwent major work in February 1916. Its rails and ballast were reinforced over the entire 78-kilometre stretch of track.

The rolling stock, which included some twenty low-powered engines, was inadequate. A call was sent out for stock from all the small local trains in France and the first locomotive from the rail network in Lozère arrived in Revigny on 22nd February. It had been manufactured by the Fives workshop in Lille and was therefore nicknamed "Lilloise" in Lozère. A few days later, the network in Lozère sent another two engines - Mallet locomotives called "Louisette" and "Cécile" ("Lilloise" and "Louisette" returned to Florac in 1919). The Meusien's engines had only two tractor axles; the locomotives from Lozère had four and they could pull a 40-tonne load, compared to 15 to 20 tonnes for "Meusien" engines. Railways throughout Meuse also sent carriages, cattle trucks and flat-deck wagons, some 800 in all which extended the capacity of the Meusien while posing a few problems as regards braking (different systems), buffers (not all at the same height), differences in distances between axles etc. The railwaymen in the 5th Engineers (10th Company) made the necessary modifications and built new lines (e.g. from Nixéville to Dugny), doubled existing routes or built unloading bays. The ballast used again came from Lozère (from Chapeauroux). It was also used to reinforce the Sacred Road, providing unexpected but effective assistance. These were the conditions under which the Meusien carried out its essential task, carrying supplies and participating in the evacuation of the wounded. 800 wagons were put into service, making up 22 double-traction trains daily in February and 35 in April. The evacuation of the wounded (which had been almost impossible at the start of the battle because of the lack of rolling stock) began with 1 train a day. This increased to 2 then to 3 convoys.

Overall, however, despite its performance, the Meusien never quite achieved the scheduled figures. Its total, 800 tonnes of supplies per day in February, increased to 2,650 in June. From 300 wounded per day in February, it increased to 930 in June. The hospital trains carried 105 wounded on stretchers and 150 sitting, plus the medical and nursing personnel who were garrisoned in the wagons on a permanent basis.

It is evident that the Sacred Road achieved its maximum output in March and that, despite outstanding efforts, the Meusien remained nothing more than a back-up.

Even though, an additional normal line was brought into service linking Sommeilles-Nettancourt to Verdun via Dugny on 21st June, after 400,000 m3 of difficult earthworks, most of the work was achieved by the road that Barrès named the "Sacred Road" in April 1916.

It was inaugurated on 21st August 1922 by Raymond Poincaré and classed as a main road on 30th December 1923.

On the Somme, in July 1916, motor transport carried all the supplies and brought all the relief troops to the battle area for the three months that the battle lasted. The system used in Verdun, with a guarded road and a Regulating Committee for motorised transport proved the excellence of the concept. In November 1917, in order to support an attack launched by the British, the High Command suddenly decided to implement an operation of the "Sacred Road" type. In just 24 hours, 3 full divisions were carried over a distance of 140 kilometres (by road and rail).

It was the transport used in 1917, added to the experience gained in Verdun, which allowed for strategic planning in 1918 and ensured that various German offensives were rebuffed in March-April. It also provided resources for the Allied offensives from July onwards. This, in turn, enabled the High Command to achieve a totally unexpected record - in July 1918, motorised transport carried 1,200,000 tonnes of supplies and 1 million men.

Today, the Sacred Road is marked out by milestones. May they remind tourists who make a pilgrimage to Verdun that, for millions of men, this was the first, and often the last, stage in their dreadful agony.

Gérard Canini (University Lecturer)